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Many healthcare agencies are producing evidence-based guidance and policy that may determine 
the availability of particular healthcare products and procedures, effectively rationing aspects of 
healthcare.  They claim legitimacy for their decisions through reference to evidence-based 
scientific method and the implementation of just decision-making procedures, often citing the 
criteria of ‘accountability for reasonableness’; publicity, relevance, challenge and revision, and 
regulation.  Central to most decision methods are estimates of gains in quality adjusted life years 
(QALY), a measure that combines the length and quality of survival.  However, all agree that the 
QALY alone is not a sufficient measure of all relevant aspects of potential healthcare benefits, 
and a number of value assessment frameworks have been suggested.  I argue that the practical 
implementation of these procedures has the potential to lead to a distorted assessment of value.  
Undue weight may be ascribed to certain attributes, particularly those that favour commercial or 
political interests, while other attributes that are highly valued by society, particularly those 
related to care processes, may be omitted or undervalued.  This may be compounded by a lack of 
transparency to relevant stakeholders, resulting in an inability for them to participate in, or 
challenge, the decisions.  The makes it likely that costly new technologies, for which inflated 
prices can be justified by the current value frameworks, are displacing aspects of healthcare that 





The rapid development of costly new healthcare technologies has resulted in escalating 
healthcare costs and the need for complex decisions regarding the funding and provision of such 
technologies.  Claims of legitimacy for such decisions are often founded upon the ‘evidence-
based’ methods that underpin them.  However, even where the best available evidence informs 
the predicted consequences of a decision, value judgements are necessary in balancing the 
competing risks, benefits, economic consequences and surrounding uncertainty.  In a previous 
paper I have explored some of the potential epistemic injustices that are inherent in the 
generation and interpretation of the underlying evidence.[1]  In this paper I explore the necessary 
value judgements, identify some of the explicit or implicit principles that are at play and consider 
the practical implementation of different value assessment frameworks.   
My personal experience largely stems from my clinical experience of working for the National 
Health Service (NHS) in the UK, and my involvement with the processes of the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which informs policy and guidance for the 
NHS. 1  Although issues of resource limitation and opportunity costs may be more overt in a 
publicly funded healthcare system, the need to value and balance the positive and negative 
outcomes of healthcare is universal, and many different healthcare systems have bodies that 
produce guidance based upon principles of cost effectiveness or comparative effectiveness. 2 
Background 
Detailed scientific methods to support evidence-based guidance and policy, are well 
documented.  Even with the best scientific evidence, decision making requires value judgements 
about the relative importance of qualitatively different outcomes and attributes of healthcare in 
widely differing conditions and treatments.   
  
Utilitarian principles demand that the greatest benefit is obtained from available resources, which 
requires that the benefits (and risks) of healthcare in differing domains are quantified and 
aggregated in an acceptable way.  Egalitarian considerations may focus on equity of access to, or 
provision of, services, or may be concerned with addressing health inequalities, objectives that 
may conflict with each other and the desire to maximize overall benefit.   Libertarian concerns 
put value on autonomy and participation in healthcare decisions.  Taken together, these create 
competing drivers that must be balanced in the decision-making process. 
Rather than explicitly defining sets of criteria and weightings for particular attributes and 
outcomes, agencies may focus on achieving legitimacy for their decisions through the processes 
by which they are made.  NICE published principles for ‘Social Value Judgements’ in 2005, 
which were revised in 2008.[2]  These were developed with input from a Citizens Council, 
established by NICE to provide ‘a public perspective on overarching moral and ethical issues’ 3, 
along with a public survey and a literature review, with further consultation, surveys and 
workshops to inform the revised version.   
NICE states that it fulfils its obligation to distributive justice through a set of procedural features 
and refers to the principles of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (A4R) that require publicity, 
relevance, challenge and revision, and regulation.[3]  The implementation of these principles by 
NICE, and many other bodies, is through deliberative processes in which advisory committees 
consider all the scientific evidence and publish reasoned decisions that are open to processes of 
consultation, challenge and revision.  This avoids the need for rigid pre-determination of the 
values ascribed to specific attributes and features of the technologies under consideration.  
However, the devil is in the detail of implementation, particularly in relation to determining 
  
which criteria the committee consider ‘relevant’, the relative weights assigned to these, and how 
transparency and challenge are achieved in relation to all possible stakeholders.   
Relevance 
Daniels and Sabin’s description of the relevance condition states; - 
“Specifically, a rationale will be reasonable if it appeals to evidence, reasons, and 
principles that are accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are disposed to 
finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation.”[3] 
The usual model of decision making gives the advisory committee the responsibility for 
assigning values and weights to the various attributes of specific interventions.  One notable 
exception is the use of the quality adjusted life year (QALY) as the preferred metric for the 
quantification of healthcare benefit.  This combines the quality and the length of survival, using 
estimates of the ‘utility’ for particular health states that are based upon societal valuation of 
generic health related quality of life (HRQoL) instruments, such as the EQ-5D.[4]    
Many agencies take a primarily utilitarian approach, calculating the incremental benefit of 
healthcare options in terms of QALYs and calculating an incremental cost effectiveness ratio 
(ICER), which may be compared to an acceptable threshold for ‘willingness to pay’ (WTP).  In 
practice, other factors frequently play into the decision through adjustment of the acceptable 
WTP threshold. 
All agencies accept that the QALY alone is insufficient to capture everything that is important in 
healthcare.  In recent years a number of value assessment frameworks have proposed additional 
elements to be included in such evaluations.[5-9]  Some agencies have explicitly considered 
additional value elements such as innovation, rarity, burden of disease and end-of-life treatments, 
  
assigning additional value to some through varying the acceptable WTP threshold,[9-13] while 
rejecting others.[7, 14]  
The identification of additional value elements raises several questions;   
1. Which are relevant, and which should be excluded from consideration?   
2. Whose values and preferences should be applied in considering the relevant attributes? 
3. How should they be incorporated into decision-making processes?   
4. How might they be considered in relation to opportunity costs and potentially displaced 
aspects of healthcare. 
Potential value elements 
I suggest that the potential value elements fall into three main groups.  The first relate to the way 
that individual health outcomes are measured (Table 1).  These include the choice of dimensions 
that go into HRQoL measures and their relative weights.  There is evidence that the current 
generic HRQoL measures, used to generate QALYs,[15] may undervalue particular conditions, 
such as sensory impairment and mental health.[16, 17]  Other value elements that fall into this 
category reflect the way in which benefits are distributed between individuals or over time, 
patterns of risk and the redistribution of value based upon the severity or the nature of the 
condition or its treatment. 
Some of these additional elements may risk double-counting of benefits or may be in direct 
conflict with other elements.  For example, ‘cure’ by its nature creates greater benefit than 
palliation and is likely to be closely related to ‘hope’, while ‘real-option value’, the opportunity 
to benefit from future developments, adds value to non-curative treatment (see Table 1).  
Additional value may be claimed for conditions with a high burden of disease and end-of-life 
  
treatments, on the basis that the public consider that greater weight should be assigned to similar 
benefits in those with greater burden of disease or near the end of their life.[18]  However, since 
the methods used to derive the utility weights that are used to calculate QALYs rely on societal 
trade-offs between the chance or duration of survival and different health scenarios, these 
preferences may already be captured in the calculated QALY benefit. 
There is also an issue of perspective.  For example, both ‘hope’ and ‘insurance value’ relate, at 
least in part, to attitudes to risk.[7]  An individual may pay more than the average prize money 
for a lottery ticket in the hope of winning (risk seeking) or may pay more than the average claim 
pay-out expected from an insurance policy that covers a high impact event (risk averse).    
Although similar considerations may apply to risk-seeking or risk-averse attitudes to healthcare, 
it is not clear that these are relevant to insurance-based or publicly funded healthcare systems 
that spread the risk across a large portfolio of conditions and treatments.  
 
Table 1. Value elements that relate to the evaluation of health outcomes. 
Value 
element 







Some outcomes, such 
as sensory impairment 
and mental health may 
not be adequately 
captured by generic 
measures, such as the 
EQ-5D.[16, 17]  
Requires modification 
of the metric used to 
generate utilities in 
QALY calculations. 
No such validated 
metric is currently 
available. 
  
Value of hope Provision of hope for 
previously untreatable 
condition has added 
value.[6]  Relates to the 
potential risk-seeking 
preferences of those 
with severe disease.[7]  
Benefits for previously 
untreatable conditions 
are preferred to greater 
total benefits from 
treating other 
conditions. 
Risks double counting. 
Difficult to quantify.  
May not be appropriate 




Added value assigned 
to new options that 
‘insure’ against ill 
health.[6]  Relates to 
risk-avoidance 
regarding rare but high 
impact health events. 
Additional value 
assigned to high impact 
treatments compared to 
multiple smaller 
incremental benefits. 
Risks double counting. 
Difficult to quantify.  
May not be appropriate 
from a societal 
perspective. 
Value of cure Return to full health 
(cure) may be 
perceived as having 
added value.[6]  
Smaller chance of (or 
fewer people) achieving 
large gains in 
length/quality of life 
preferred to larger 
chance (or greater 
numbers) gaining 
smaller benefits. 
Risks double counting. 
May conflict with 
‘burden-of-disease’ and 
‘real option value’. 
May not be appropriate 




Additional weight may 
be given to benefits of 
life-extending 
treatments given to 
people with short life 
expectancy.[11]  
Similar to burden of 
disease (see below) but 
has been more narrowly 
applied in relation to 
life expectancy rather 
than HRQoL. 
Incorporated into NICE 
methodology, although 
there is little evidence to 





Some evidence for 
higher value placed on 
gains in health for 
those with the greatest 
burden of disease.[18]  
Equivalent gains in 
health are considered 
more valuable for those 
with poorer initial 
health.  i.e. utility 
change from 0.1 to 0.2 
given more weight than 
0.8 to 0.9 
Was considered in NICE 
consultation on value-
based assessment to 
replace end-of life 
guidance, using a 
‘proportional shortfall’ 
model and rejected.[14]  
Cancer label Conditions and 
treatments related to a 
cancer diagnosis may 
be given special 
status.[19]  
Equivalent benefit for 
people with cancer 
diagnosis is given 
preference over similar 
benefit in other 
conditions. 
The Cancer Drugs Fund 
in the UK was founded 
on the assumption that 
cancer should be given 
special treatment   This 
does not appear to have 






treatments provide the 
potential to benefit 
from future medical 
developments.[6]  
Gains that come from 
increased survival from 
a non-curative treatment 
for a chronic condition 
are preferred to similar 
benefits from cure or 
improved HRQoL.  
Difficulty in defining 
the conditions and 
treatments to which this 
is relevant and conflicts 
with valuing cure. 
Discount rate Lower discount rates 
have been suggested 
for treatments with 
extended benefits.[21]  
There is considerable 
debate about 
appropriate discount 
rates.[22, 23]  Lower 
rates for extended 
benefits advantages 
Discount rates may be 
considered to be a 
technical economic 
issue or relate to societal 
time preferences.  Either 
way there seems little 
  
technologies with high 
early costs offset by late 




rationale for varying the 
discount rates for 
different technologies. 
 
A second set of potential value elements relates to the wider implications of healthcare, rather 
than the risks and benefits for individual patients.  These include equity considerations, wider 
societal impacts and additional value that might be attributed to treatments for rare conditions or 
innovative technologies (Table 2).   
 
Table 2. Value elements related to wider impacts of healthcare 
Value element Rationale Implications Issues 
Rarity Many authorities provide 
special treatment for rare 
conditions, orphan drugs 
etc. on the basis of 
equity or commercial 
considerations.[12, 13]  
Higher 
willingness-to-
pay for healthcare 





This is controversial 
and does not appear to 





Poor health may impair a 
person’s capacity to 
engage with society, 
such as through paid or 
Added value may 
be attributed to 
treatments and 
patient groups 
that are more 
There are ethical 
issues around 
measures that would 
value people based 
upon some measure of 
  
unpaid employment or 
providing care for others.  
likely to have 
greater benefits to 
society 
‘productivity’.  NICE 
suggested using a 
‘societal shortfall 
approach’ [18] but 
subsequently rejected 
the proposal.[14]  
Equality (non-
discrimination) and 
equity of access  




prescribing’ was one of 
the drivers for the 
development of 
NICE.[25]  
If a treatment is 
more cost 





equality and cost 
effectiveness 
Ethnicity, age and 
gender may be 
important risk factors 
for disease and the 
outcome of treatment 






This is a founding 
principal of the NHS and 
a stated government 
objective.[26]  
Resources may 




those with higher 
burden of disease. 
May require positive 
discrimination and, 
thus, be at odds with 






of science means new 
products may underpin 
further products.[6]  
Value of new 
product is 
distributed 
between the steps 
in the chain of 
development 
Would also imply a 
reduced value to 
account for prior 
developments, such as 




Fear of contagion / 
risk of contagion 
Fear of, or the risk of 
contagion may require 
public health measures 
or influence behaviour in 
a way that has significant 
health and economic 
impacts, beyond the 
direct effects of the 







and above that 
justified by the 
likely health 
consequences. 
Difficult to quantify 




NICE considered wider societal impact as part of a consultation on value-based pricing.[18] 
They highlighted some potential discriminatory problems that it raises and suggested a ‘wider 
societal shortfall’ approach using average values to overcome this, but subsequently dropped the 
proposal following consultation.[14]  Equity considerations highlight the tension between 
providing equal and fair access to healthcare and targeted measures that aim to reduce health 
inequalities.[26]    Innovation and scientific spill-over have been suggested, but it is not clear that 
a scientifically innovative product should be assigned value over that which is captured in health 
benefits.  Although healthcare developments are often incremental there are difficulties in 
evaluating the potential future value of, as yet unknown, future developments.  Furthermore, the 
implication of assigning value to a development that might underpin future products is that value 
should also be reduced to account for prior stages in development.  For example, should all gene 
therapies be discounted to allow for the publicly funded human genome project on which they 
are founded?[27]  The current Covid-19 pandemic demonstrates the huge potential health and 
economic implications of contagious diseases, but in the absence of a specific epidemic, it is 
  
difficult to obtain credible estimates of the risks, costs and other implications of an, as yet 
unknown, contagious condition. 
A final group of potential attributes that may warrant value are healthcare processes, as distinct 
from outcomes (Table 3).   
Table 3. Value elements relating to the process of care. 




There are established 
preferences for less 
invasive treatments, 
such as oral rather than 
parenteral 
administration [28] and 
minimally invasive 
rather than open 
surgical 
procedures.[29]  
QALY benefits may 
be foregone in favour 
of preferred, less 
invasive, treatments. 
Requires a method for 
quantifying the process 
utility and incorporating 
this in decision making. 
Convenience 
(e.g. choice of 
location and 
timing) 
Evidence that people 
prefer, and are willing 
to pay for these aspects 
of healthcare 
provision.[30] 
QALY benefits may 
be foregone in favour 
of service aspects 
such as location and 




Patient choice has been 
seen as a political 
priority,[31] but may tend 
to increase health 




Evidence that patients 
value participation in 
shared decision making 
and that this may also 
Patients may have 
personal preferences 
for treatment options 
that appear less cost 
There are several 
overlapping issues; 
autonomy may be 




result in improved 
clinical outcomes in 
some cases.[34]  
Choice and autonomy 
may also have intrinsic 
value.[35] 
effective, based upon 
a societal perspective. 
outcomes, individual 
patient preferences may 
differ from societal 
preferences, and societal 
preferences may value the 





Aspects of care such as 
privacy and being 
treated with dignity, 
respect and compassion 
are highly valued by 
patients.[36, 37]  
Dignified and 
compassionate care 
may require resources 
for suitable facilities, 
staffing training and 
supervision, which 
need to be traded off 
against resources 
devoted to health 
benefits 
These are complex 
concepts which may be 
difficult to define and 
measure. 
 
Health technology assessment nominally includes all healthcare activities and care processes but, 
in practice, tends to focus on drugs, devices and diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, 
particularly new developments with significant cost implications.  Considerable healthcare 
resources are devoted to service provision for chronic care and people with self-limiting 
conditions, which are less likely to be subject to such assessments.[38, 39]  Expenditure is rarely 
ring-fenced, so value that is attributed to care processes must compete directly with the resources 
assigned to achieving health outcomes.  Furthermore, the increasing elderly and frail population 
with complex health needs is blurring the boundary between social care and healthcare.[40, 41]  
In the UK, NICE has taken on responsibility for social care guidance and the close relationship 
  
and interdependencies between social care and healthcare raises questions about the need for a 
common basis for evaluation.[42]  
Values attributable to aspects of care processes have received far less attention in the literature 
than health outcomes, but it is clear that there are many features of the process of care that are 
valued by society.[36, 43, 44]  These include more abstract concepts such as dignity, respect, 
compassion and autonomy, and more concrete issues such as choice over the location and timing 
of services, continuity of care, participation in decisions and the invasiveness of treatments. 
NICE’s Citizens Council concluded that “…there are elements of care that provide huge benefit 
but cost nothing to provide, compassion for example, but that can get forgotten in the continuous 
discussion about resources and cost of care.”[45]  They identified other process attributes of 
importance including dignity, respect and individual choice that should be taken into account in 
considering equity and efficiency.[46]  Far from ‘costing nothing’, I suggest that compassionate 
care requires staffing levels that are adequate and consistent, staff with the appropriate levels of 
experience, training, appropriate provision for clinical supervision and oversight, and 
professional accountability.[37]  Dignity requires sufficient facilities to provide privacy for 
patients receiving end-of-life care and to avoid patients being treated on trolleys in corridors, 
while awaiting an available bed.  Patient choice requires time for professionals to adequately 
present the pros and cons of all treatment options and enough spare capacity in the system to 
accommodate flexibility.   All these aspects are costly to provide and are elements of healthcare 
provision that may be displaced by the financial pressures that result from the approval of new 
and costly technologies.[47]  
This brief review demonstrates the large number of potential value elements that may be relevant 
to healthcare decisions.  The value that society assigns to modern healthcare, as a public good, 
  
extends far beyond the maximisation of quality adjusted survival, or any other measure of health 
processes and outcomes.  Society may value healthcare activities that provide little or no health 
benefit, or may even risk harms, when measured in such terms, to attain other perceived benefits.  
Although such areas are often a cause for controversy, many healthcare systems will fund 
cosmetic procedures, contraception, infertility treatment, gender reassignment and, in some 
jurisdictions, abortion and assisted dying.  These examples demonstrate the increasing remit of 
healthcare services in meeting societal objectives that are not confined to providing health 
benefits, but may encompass lifestyle preferences and respect for autonomy and self-
determination. 
Whose values? 
A number of constituencies may have differing views on relevance and priority. There may be 
executive or political priorities set by government agencies or other authorities, views from 
expert advisory bodies, societal perspectives derived from the population in question, or the 
values of individual patients. 
The widely accepted view with regard to prioritizing dimensions of health outcomes, is that the 
most appropriate values are those of a societal sample from the general population of the 
community concerned.[48] This has been extended to other aspects of value, and research has 
attempted to value preferences in other areas.[19]   Most agencies consider that societal 
preferences should guide such decisions; as NICE puts it these are “social value judgements 
[that] relate to society rather than science”.[2]   
However, NICE’s original document on social value judgements has now been superseded, 
which raised concerns about a change in direction.[49]    Despite the Citizens Council 
concluding that rarity should not be given any special treatment [2] and empirical evidence that 
  
society does not consider rarity to deserve special consideration,[19] NICE produced guidance 
that prioritizes ‘highly specialized technologies’.[10]  This allows some technologies to be 
approved at a threshold that potentially displaces at least ten QALYs for one gained from the 
new technology.  NICE is not unique in this.  Rarity is an attribute that has received considerable 
attention from several agencies and often attracts a premium,[12, 13] despite concerns that this 
lacks face validity.[24]  
Decision making 
Every decision or recommendation requires explicit or implicit choices about the value attributes 
that are relevant, and the weight attached to each.  The process for determining these is closely 
related to the question of whose values are considered relevant.  Much evidence-based guidance 
provides flexibility that may allow individual patients to participate in such decisions, 
incorporating their personal preferences.  However, meaningful participation requires that they 
must be fully informed about the impact of those choices on the aspects of care and outcomes 
about which they may have such preferences.  Geographical variation in practice might suggest 
that, where there is such flexibility, it is more often the clinicians’ rather than patients’ 
preferences that govern treatment decisions.[50] 
There are a number of methods for obtaining empirical societal valuations through techniques 
such as discrete choice experiments,[51] time-trade-off,[4] contingent valuation [52] and 
standard gamble.[53]   Such methods have been used to quantify societal preferences for HRQoL 
and many other aspects of healthcare, including location,[54, 55] process utilities,[29, 56] 
waiting times [57, 58] and other characteristics of care.[51, 59]  However, in practice, attributes 
other than QALYs are considered by advisory committees through a deliberative process within 
  
a policy framework.  Thus, the values assigned to specific attributes are rarely transparent and 
reflect those of policymakers and committee members rather than wider society.   
The lack of transparency is compounded by the most common method of decision making, 
which relies upon defining a WTP threshold for the acceptable ICER, which may be varied to 
account for additional value elements.  This creates anomalies and distortions, as very different 
situations may result in similar ratios.  Furthermore, if a more costly healthcare activity has other 
valuable attributes, but produces no QALY gain, such as the compassionate care of an 
unconscious patient, increased patient choice, or some of the other examples given above, these 
can never be considered cost effective, however high the threshold. A possible alternative to 
varying the WTP threshold is to use net costs or benefits (see Box 1, for a worked example).   
There have been attempts to make such decisions more transparent through formal processes, 
such as multi-criteria decision analysis or augmented cost effectiveness analysis.[8, 60-62]  
Although such methods may improve transparency, they also rely upon the values and 
preferences of committee members, which may not be an adequate proxy for societal 
preferences.  Committees will tend to be largely composed of those with a specific interest in the 
technologies under consideration and may not formally represent the views of those whose 
healthcare may be displaced by decisions with significant resource implications. 
Furthermore, such methods assume that values assigned to different attributes may vary between 
decision problems.  This may be acceptable for a decision that considers an exhaustive set of 
possible uses for defined resources, but it cannot account for the opportunity costs of 
unidentified and unknown activities that may be displaced.   Although such decisions are open to 
consultation, the consultees on policy documents and specific guidance are largely those with a 
vested commercial, professional, or personal interest in the new technologies, with those having 
  
greater commercial resources able to mount the strongest challenges.[63]  It is unlikely that those 
who may be disadvantaged by reduced, withdrawn or delayed services that might result from 
such decisions will even be aware of the potential effects, let alone be in a position to contribute 
meaningfully to the consultation.  
Opportunity costs 
For most bodies carrying out such appraisals, decisions are primarily based upon estimated cost 
effectiveness, compared to an explicit or implicit WTP threshold.[64]  The main rationale for 
such thresholds relates to ‘opportunity costs’, limiting the resources that can be allocated to an 
intervention to prevent it from displacing greater benefit elsewhere (described as ‘supply-side’ 
thresholds).  For this purpose, benefit is commonly defined in terms of QALYs.  There is no 
universally agreed mechanism for setting such thresholds, and there is considerable international 
variation.[65]   The little empirical evidence that exists regarding displaced activity, suggests that 
thresholds may currently be set too high, resulting in a net loss of health in QALY terms.[66]  
Consideration of additional value elements creates difficulties in dealing with opportunity costs.  
In practice, where additional elements are currently taken into account, such as in guidance 
relating to rarity, end-of-life or other factors,[10-13, 67] this has been through elevation of the 
threshold, without any corresponding reduction in other areas, or consideration of the attribute in 
relation to displaced activity. 
There are several potential ways to address the issue of opportunity costs.  The first option is to 
ignore them completely.  Where healthcare budgets are not fixed, some argue that the threshold 
should represent what society is able or willing to pay for healthcare (‘demand-side’ 
thresholds).[64] The evidence suggests that such estimates tend to be higher than those based 
upon potentially displaced activity and are thus likely to result in increasing healthcare 
  
expenditure.[68]  Healthcare systems that do not have a clearly fixed budget may accept 
increasing costs to cover new technologies that are considered cost effective against such a 
threshold. 
The implication of such a policy is that healthcare expenditure is likely to rise.  The overall 
increase in the resources devoted to healthcare will raise the supply side threshold, until the point 
is reached at which it matches the demand-side threshold, when opportunity costs will come into 
play.  There will always be opportunity costs, but these may fall outside the healthcare system, as 
an increasing proportion of personal or collective income is assigned to healthcare and displaces 
other opportunities for use of those resources.  Under these circumstances, there is no theoretical 
need to alter the threshold to account for additional value elements, but the failure to do so will 
result in a more rapid inflation of healthcare costs, and accelerate the point at which opportunity 
costs become relevant. 
Where opportunity costs are considered, any threshold could, in theory, be adjusted to allow for 
the prevalence of additional value elements in potentially displaced activity.  This might be 
achieved by combining or weighting other attributes to create a ‘compound’ measure of benefit, 
for which a threshold could be sought, or by establishing a set of per-patient or per-service net 
benefit thresholds, at which certain attributes would be considered acceptable.  However, even 
evaluating the QALY value of displaced activity is difficult and, with the lack of clearly agreed 
attributes and metrics, this would be a complex task.   
A second approach is to consider disinvestment decisions using identical criteria to investment 
decisions, creating a level playing field, in which the criteria used to judge both investment and 
disinvestment are aligned.[69]  However, it is unusual for cost pressures to result in savings 
  
through disinvestment in a particular technology.[70]  More frequently these are achieved 
through reducing service levels, delaying or limiting access, or dilution of services.[47] 
A third possibility is to consider new technologies within a ring-fenced development budget, 
similar to the current arrangements for the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) in the UK[71].  The CDF 
was introduced in 2011 with a fund of £200M for new cancer drugs and rapidly outgrew its 
budget, with a total spend of £466M in 2015/16, amidst criticism that it was a poor use of 
resources.[20]  NICE was given responsibility for managing the CDF in 2016, and the new 
arrangements gave NICE the potential to recommend drugs for interim funding, subject to the 
pharmaceutical companies agreeing financial controls, which prevent overspend by applying a 
rebate where demand outstrips the available resources.[71]  
Such arrangements provide a practical solution that allows multiple criteria to be considered in 
deciding between competing technologies and is a way in which it might be acceptable to use 
different weighting for particular attributes, without needing to consider the impact on 
unidentified and potentially displaced aspects of care.  However, such arrangements risk creating 
different thresholds for new and established technologies or creating different thresholds from 
year to year, depending upon the current competition for resources. 
Conclusions 
It is widely accepted that the QALY alone is not a sufficient measure of value for quantifying the 
benefit of healthcare.  However, it is not clear that the additional elements that are currently 
considered align with societal preferences, elements relating to care processes appear to be 
missing, and little attempt has been made to account for opportunity costs.  I suggest that a set of 
conditions are required to satisfy the relevance criteria of A4R; 
  
1. All relevant attributes are considered: it is not sufficient for those which are considered, 
to be relevant, if additional relevant criteria are omitted. 
2. Attributes that are not relevant and potential overlaps are excluded. 
3. Attributes are weighted, formally or informally, according to the values and preferences 
of the appropriate constituency.  Generally, this will be societal or patient values. 
4. Attributes and weights should remain consistent between decisions in different 
circumstances that compete for the same pool of resources. 
5. Thresholds should recognize the opportunity cost of potentially displaced activity, 
including the prevalence of all relevant attributes in this activity. 
If society is to distribute limited healthcare resources in a morally justifiable fashion, then it 
seems appropriate that all technologies and caring processes are judged against a consistent set of 
criteria that reflect societal preferences.  To focus on the QALY, or any other measure that 
purely reflects health outcomes, without considering the importance that the public attributes to 
aspects such as processes of care, self-determination, and equity, risks displacing highly valued 





Box 1 - Illustration of decision making based upon willingness-to-pay thresholds or 
net benefit. 
Many agencies make decisions on the basis of comparing the ICER to a threshold 
range, with the acceptable threshold being varied to take account of additional 
elements of value.  As the ICER is a ratio, this runs the risk of reducing the 
transparency of the decision, perhaps best illustrated by an example based upon the 
NICE methodology.[67] 
Consider the case of an intervention that has the benefit of a less invasive or more 
convenient process, such as outpatient rather than inpatient treatment, or oral rather 
than intravenous administration.  If an advisory committee wishes to recognize this in 
its decision, it may vary the WTP threshold within the range specified in the NICE 
methods guidance.   For a high cost intervention, such as regenerative medicines,[72] 
where an ICER of £30,000 per QALY might be based upon an incremental cost of 
£300,000 per patient for a 10 QALY benefit, the effect of pushing the threshold from 
£20,000 to £30,000 per QALY is effectively to value this extra benefit at £100,000 
per patient.  In contrast, for an intervention which has low average cost and benefit, 
such as is the case for many preventative treatments or screening procedures, the 
average incremental cost per patient may be £30 for an incremental benefit of 0.001 
QALY, so the same change in threshold will value the additional benefit of less 
invasive treatment at only £10 per patient.   
An alternative approach would be to use a baseline threshold, currently £20,000 per 
QALY, to calculate net monetary/health cost or benefit per patient.  This would then 
allow a transparent consideration of the additional cost, or reduced health that is 
justified by any additional considerations.  In the above example the first new, less 
invasive procedure would have a net monetary cost of £100,000, while the new 
preventative treatment has a net cost of £10.  It might be understandable that a 
committee would consider it worth a few additional pounds per patient for a less 
invasive procedure, but not several thousand pounds, a difference that would not be 



































































































































































































































































1  Strictly, the NICE remit does not extend to the whole of the UK, with some responsibilities for 
healthcare devolved to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  Thus, the constituency varies for different 
aspects of NICE guidance. 
2  Examples of such bodies include; Institute for Clinical and Economic Review in the US 
(https://icer-review.org), CADTH in Canada (https://www.cadth.ca) and the Australian Medical Services 
Advisory Committee (http://www.msac.gov.au). 
3  For details of the NICE citizens council see: https://www.nice.org.uk/get-involved/citizens-council 
